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Abstract 
 
The internet provides new channels for citizen voices, expression of minority viewpoints, and 
political mobilisation. In Egypt, Russia, Syria and China, blogs, online forums, Facebook and 
Twitter already provide citizens with a new form of public sphere and alternative source of news 
and information, which are seen as a new platform for exchanging news.This research paper is 
drawing data from blogging sites and printed media which reported on the worst civic conflict in 
the post-soviet history of Kazakhstan. During the celebration of the 20th anniversary of 
Kazakhstan's independence, oil workers in the town of Zhanaozen clashed with the state police. 
This sparked an increased online activity of Kazakh bloggers and political activists. As a result 
of this engagement, the Kazakh officials took the county's top bloggers to the town itself in the 
hope of getting some positive feedback online. Consequently, many of them backed the 
government's assertions. This example signified both the importance of the active online Kazakh 
community and the government's realisation of the importance of online engagement with its 
citizens.What can we learn from the Zhanaozen case about the role of online social media in 
political transformation in Kazakhstan? What is the role of the Kazakh government in controlling 
the political dissent using the cyberspace? This research will contribute to a better understanding 
of the current political processes in Kazakhstan, and will demonstrate the relation between the 
increased use of online social media and the political activism in Kazakhstan., 
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 Introduction  
 
This paper presents findings from an ongoing research project on the role of online social media 
and activism in political processes and political participation in Kazakhstan. It uses as a case 
study the civic conflict in the town of Zhanaozen in 2011 and the engagement of netizens as 
bloggers in the subsequent events.  
 
The research of this paper is based on fits within the context of online social activism that has 
been used recently as a new tool for social and political activism in countries like Egypt, Russia, 
Syria and China which were and some still are driven by authoritarian regimes. Traditional forms 
of public mass communication are now challenged by internet-based communications 
worldwide. The internet provides new channels for citizen voices, expression of minority 
viewpoints, and political mobilisation (Etling, Kelly, Faris & Palfrey, 2010). In countries with 
restricted media freedom, blogs, online forums, Facebook and Twitter already provide citizens 
with a new form of public sphere and alternative source of news and information.  
 
The Zhanaozen case study 
 
The research draws data from blogging sites and printed media that reported on the worst civic 
conflict in the post-soviet history of Kazakhstan. In December of 2011, during the celebration of 
the 20th anniversary of Kazakhstan’s independence, oil workers clashed with the state police. 
These oil workers were on strike since May of 2011 following disputes over pay and working 
conditions. Authorities claimed that 16 people were killed and 100 were injured during the 
December uprising. YouTube videos demonstrated that the police fired directly into the large 
crowd. As a result, the Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, imposed a state of emergency 
in Zhanaozen, and all forms of communication with the rest of the country were cut off, 
including mobile and internet services (Human Rights Watch, 2011). The government expected 
that by cutting Zhanaozen from the outside world it would restore peace in the region, however, 
the lack of information only destabilised the situation.  
After one of the first videos was released on YouTube showing police marching towards a group 
of unarmed protestors and then opening fire, the Kazakhstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office 
opened a criminal investigation into the security forces’ actions (Lillis, 2011).  In the weeks 
following the clashes in Zhanaozen, the office of the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan at the time, 
Karim Massimov, invited the country’s most active and popular bloggers to visit Zhanaozen; 
indicating a change of attitude towards new media by the authorities. They appeared willing to 
address the issues and concerns circulating on the internet about the situation in Zhanaozen by 
using sources perceived as more credible than the pro-governmental outlets. The trip was dubbed 
‘Zhanaozen, the witnesses’ perspective’ by the Prime Minister’s office. The accredited bloggers 
and journalists1, all ethnic Kazakhs, visited the city, tweeted, took pictures and wrote about the 
incident. Although one of the bloggers (Sadenova) noted the investigation of the events was not 
carried out by the bloggers, they still mainly reinforced the official position, and as a result, 
                                                1Journalists	  of	  the	  www.tengrinews.kz	  and	  www.bnews.kz	  Renat	  Tashkinbayev	  and	  Anar	  Bazmuhametova	  were	  also	  invited.	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 immediately nicknamed the ‘bloody bloggers’ by the rest of the Kazakh blogosphere 
(Cybernautika.com, 2011). 
One blogger (Dmitry Shyolokov) who was not part of the Prime Minister’s group stated “The 
Kazakh people never had a chance to doubt the fact that the state media is only capable of lying 
(Shyolokov, 2012). Hence, the visit of bloggers to Zhanaozen was taken as a way to cover up the 
events in Zhanaozen online too”.  Such views triggered an opposition group of bloggers to form 
their own team to visit the town. They called their trip ‘Bloggers from Zhanaozen: Different 
Perspective’.   
 
The Zhanaozen events thus provide an excellent case study for the role online social media can 
play in the political processes of the post-socialist authoritarian Kazakhstan. 
 
Online media and authoritarian states 
 
Digital media are increasingly used for civic activism (Calingaert, 2010). The Internet is 
becoming an increasingly important tool for human rights activists to mobilise and advocate for 
political and socio-economic reforms. It usually provides greater space for free expression than 
traditional media and in restricted media environments bloggers are often at the forefront of 
efforts to push the bounds of free expression. It has also become a central medium through which 
ordinary citizens can express themselves as well as share their ideas. Netizens are at the 
epicentre of political changes all over the world trying to both resist and to challenge 
authoritarian states (Reporters Without Borders, 2011).  
 
However, it is important to note that the Internet is the least censored medium due to its 
distributed network. Hence, ‘politically sensitive’ content which criticises governments is prone 
to spread online faster than in traditional media (Mou et al, 2011). During times of crisis, 
communities receive their information through the Internet as well as through interpersonal 
communication channels, as recent event in the Middle East and the former Soviet Union 
republics have demonstrated. The Internet, consequently, has become a potential avenue for 
dissent (ibid). 
  
Media, Internet and Censorship in Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan declared its independence from the Soviet Union on the 16th of December of 1991, 
and it was the last USSR republic to do so. Its former Soviet leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev, 
became Kazakhstan’s first President, a position he still retains today. Despite the high hopes for 
the emergence of democracy in Central Asia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (A 
Sobering Reality, 2012), Kazakhstan is still viewed today as an authoritarian state (Economist’s 
Democracy Index, 2012) where the President plays the role of ”the highest state office, 
responsible for naming the government and all other republic’s officials” (Kekic, 2007). The 
President’s influence extends to media too as his family controls the majority of newspapers and 
television stations, including the state television company – Khabar (Cummings, 2005).  
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 At a glance, Kazakhstan appears to have a strong media industry, including over 2,500 regularly 
published newspapers and magazines. Private mass-media make up nearly 80 per cent of all the 
existing mass media. There are also 238 representatives of online media, as well as 100 
television and radio stations (eGov, 2012). However, in spite of a large volume of periodical 
publications and other forms of media, Kazakhstan ranks only 182nd out of 196 countries, and 
26th out of the 29 former Soviet republics, for press freedom (Freedom House, 2013). Freedom 
House also indicated that the authorities have narrowed the space for independent voices even 
further in 2012 by banning around 40 opposition media outlets, one of which was the main 
national opposition news organisation, and stepping up violence and legal prosecution of the 
remaining independent and critical journalists (RWB, 2013). World Press Freedom Index 2013 
(RWB, 2013) suggested that President Nazarbayev’s government ‘moved closer to the ultra-
authoritarian model of its neighbours in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.’ Such statistics clearly 
indicate the existence of tight control over the media by the Kazakh government, and a strong 
system of censorship that also spills over onto the Internet.      
Initially, Kazakhstan’s government considered the internet as a new source for strengthening its 
economic position in Central Asia by becoming the region’s information-technology hub. 
According to the World Economic Forum's Networked Readiness Index 2012, Kazakhstan is the 
top-ranked country of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in terms of information 
and communication technologies (ICT) and digital uptake. The government has made the 
development of digital information technologies a national priority resulting in attempts to 
liberalise the communication sector and promote internet usage (Nichol, 2012).  
However, the government has realised the democratising power of the Internet and tried to 
control access to it (Freedom House, 2011). Kazakhstan’s general prosecutor has publicly 
spoken out in favour of increased control of social networks, calling it ‘the evil’ (A Sobering 
Reality, 2012). In 2009, a new bill was passed equating Internet resources with other media, 
allowing the government to interfere in the content of domestic and international online 
resources available in Kazakhstan. Since 2011, access to 160 websites has been blocked limited 
because they allegedly spread ’extremist’ propaganda. LiveJournal was one of them (Reutskiy, 
2012). As the events were unfolding in Zhanaozen, the authorities blocked the access to Twitter 
temporarily. The online video portal www.stan.kz which was covering events in Zhanaozen was 
sued by the authorities for health and safety reasons. Another news website, www.guljan.org, 
was subjected to cyber-attacks in 2011, and one of its reporters was convicted of criminal 
charges before the website was eventually blocked (A Sobering Reality, 2012).  
Despite government censorship, internet usage in Kazakhstan has grown dramatically over the 
last ten years  – from 0.7 per cent penetration rate in t2000 to 28 per cent (or 4.3 million people) 
by the end of 2010 (Freedom House, 2011). There are more than seven thousand registered 
websites in Kazakhstan. Kazakhtelecom is the largest telecom company holding a 73 per cent 
share of the market for internet and data communications and offers broadband internet access in 
all major cities and regions (Kazakhtelecom Annual report, 2011). State-run Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) – Kazakhtelecom, dominates the internet and mobile market and routinely blocks 
sites which publish ‘sensitive’ information, which until recently included both www.respublika-
kaz.info and www.k-plus.tv.net. Both of these websites were sponsored by the political 
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 opposition in exile.  However, the K+ news channel which was rather popular on the internet as 
it provided the alternative to the state media news representation was shut down, due to 
numerous disagreements between the main sponsors of the channel. To further its control the 
government established new regulations which stipulate all top-level .kz domain owners must 
route their traffic through servers which are physically located in Kazakhstan. As a result, 
Google had to pull out of Kazakhstan.  
The 2008 blocking of LiveJournal, at the time the most popular blogging platform in 
Kazakhstan, generated significant changes to the country's blogosphere. Before it was blocked, 
LiveJournal hosted 32 per cent of all active Russian-language blogs in Kazakhstan, or nearly 
230,000 users. Some bloggers migrated to other international platforms like blogger.com or 
LiveInternet.ru, while others retained their blogs on LiveJournal but used a proxy server to 
access it. One of the local blogging sites, Yvision.kz, has emerged as the most popular 
Kazakhstan-based blog-hosting platform, with over 14,000 users’ blogging mostly in Russian 
(Emrich & Plakhina, 2013).  
In an effort to counter criticism of the blocking of LiveJournal and demonstrate a willingness to 
engage with citizens online, government officials started to keep their own blogs and Twitter 
accounts in recent years. The initiative appears to have attracted little attention and has had a 
limited impact on public opinion as the blogs generally resemble other government press portals 
in style and content (Freedom House, 2011). 
 
 
Data collection 
 
Data was collected over a period of three months, from 16 December 2011 (when the events 
started) to 27 March 2012 (when the trials of the 37 oil workers began). The blogging websites 
YVision and Livejournal were the primary focus of analysis. These sites were chosen because of 
their popularity in the Kazakhstan’s blogosphere. In addition, two Kazakhstan national 
newspapers (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda and Golos Respubliki), including the online version of the 
Golos Respubliki, were included as they both represented the mainstream traditional media. 
These newspapers provide a comparative context against which the blogging sites are positioned 
in terms of content.  
 
§ www.yvision.kz – Kazakhstan’s main blogging platform. The website includes the 
blogging platform itself, online-TV and special projects both in Russian and Kazakh.  
§ www.livejournal.com – Russian social networking website. Users can either keep a 
blog, a journal, or a diary. The service is also used for political commentary, in 
Russia in particular. This website was initially selected due to the fact some members 
of the opposition in exile used this particular website for communication with 
Kazakhstan’s blogosphere.  
§ Kazakhstanskaya Pravda is the Kazakhstan’s national newspaper and the main 
official and business information source in the country. Legislative documents come 
into effect once they are published in the newspaper. 
§ Golos Respubliki is the opposition private newspaper known for its critical articles 
about the government and corruption. It was forced to cease printing in 2012 as a 
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 result of a government-initiated lawsuit and is now only available online (Emrich & 
Plakhina, 2013).  
§ Respublika portal – www.respublika-kz.info – online space for expert discussion on 
political processes and issues in both Central Asia and Russia.  
 
In the process of identifying the blogging sites and creating content categories, it was soon 
realised that the LiveJournal platform was not used as much as expected by the Kazakh since it 
was blocked in the country, and not many Kazakhs knew how to circumvent the restrictions by 
employing proxy services. Instead the main blogging platform turned out to be the 
www.yvision.kz website.  The so-called ‘bloody bloggers’ mainly used it to write about their trip 
to Zhanaozen. Those who went on a separate, independent trip to the town were posting their 
blogs and comments there as well. 
 
 
 
Identifying data categories 
 
A two stage content analysis was conducted. The first stage was seen as the general mapping 
of the content and participants.  The following five questions, informed by literature were 
developed for the initial content analysis stage which generated separate themes with sub-
themes used in the subsequent qualitative content analysis: 
 
§ How was the conflict in Zhanaozen framed?  
The preliminary research identified the main sub-themes: socio-economic issues; law and 
(dis)order; political instability caused by the opposition in exile; political instability 
caused by the internal force; conspiracy; and other.  
§ Who was the voice of the events?  
The following were identified: national government; army; police; protesters; 
Kazakhstan Prosecutor General’s l office; the oil company – KazMunaiGaz; and political 
opposition both inside and outside of Kazakhstan. 
§ What is the story subject of the news reports/ blogs? 
The three main subjects included: discussions about social networking websites; socio-
economic issues; and the role of printed media and TV in covering the events of 
Zhanaozen. 
§ What story sources are used? 
§ What is the main language of blogging?  (Russian, Kazakh or English) 
 
The mapping of content and participants also identified the following three main groups of 
bloggers: those selected by the government to visit the city also known as the ‘bloody bloggers;’ 
those who went on a trip to Zhanaozen independently, called by others the ‘free bloggers;’ and 
the remaining bloggers who either supported the first or the second group or remained neutral.  
 
Findings 
  
Framing  
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 The     following     sub---themes       emerged     from     the     findings:     socio---economic     issues;     law     and     
(dis)order;    political    instability   caused   by   the   opposition     in     exile;   political   instability   
caused   by   the   internal   force;    conspiracy;        and      other.      Political      instability      and     law      and     
disorder      were  two      of      the      key      emerging    framing       perspectives.     New     Kazakhs     or     
Oralmans     (ethnic     Kazakhs)     seem     to     become     a     scapegoat,    accused    by    some    to    be    the   
 cause    of    the    instability.          
   
 
The   Respublika   newspaper   and     the   bloggers   who   either   did     not   go   to   Zhanaozen     on   
  an     organised    trip       or     went     there     by     themselves     –     the     ‘free’     bloggers,     believe     the     
source     of     the     problem     is     the    current       socio---economic       conditions     both     in     the     region     and     
in     the     country     which     have     led     to     the    uprising    in     Zhanaozen.       These   problems  were    
identified   as   social   injustice,   the   inability   of     the   local    and         state       authorities       to      
intervene       and      solve       the       emerging       issues,       class       struggle       of       particular    members    of   the 
  society,   ethnic   tensions   among   Kazakhs   and   newly   migrated   Oralmans,   lack   of   job   
 opportunities,        poverty,      control      of      all      natural      resources      by      a      group      which      is      close      to      
President    Nazarbayev,    and    the    working    conditions    of    the    protesting    oil    workers.        
   
 
The   ‘law   and   disorder’     aspect   seemed   to   be   another   emerging   theme.     Some   
bloggers,     mainly   those  who  went    on    the    trip    organised    by    the    government    authorities,   
 pointed    at    the    recent    immigration    of  the         Oralmans         into         the         region         from         other         
countries         e.g.,         China,         Uzbekistan         and         Kyrgyzstan.    According    to    some    of    them,    the   
 Oralmans    might    be    responsible    for    the    Zhanaozen    uprising.    Blogger    Zhomart      states     that    
the    police    forces     were    not    firing     indiscriminately,    but    only     at    the    extremists    who       were      
attacking      the      constitutional      order     of     the     country.     The     protestors     were     terrorists,     he   
 concludes    (Toregozhina,    2011).        
   
 
Kazakhstanskaya   Pravda   (KazPravda)     looked   at   events   from   a   ‘law   and   disorder’   
perspective   and    suggested            the          protests          were          started          by          hooligans.         The          ‘bloody          
bloggers’   agree          with          this    interpretation    adding   that   some   ‘forces’   have   used     the   oil   
workers   to     cause   havoc     in   the   region.   It    suggested    they    are    trying    to    destabilise   
 Kazakhstan    by    breaking    up    society    into    small    groups    which    question      the         nation’s         
integrity,         unity         and         stability.         The         fact         that         Kazakhstan         is         integrating    economically   
  with   both   Russia   and   Belarus  might    have   upset   some   states   –   was   also   named   as   
one    of    the    possibilities    by    KazPravda.      
   
 
In  the    Respublika    newspaper,    the    events    in    Zhanaozen    were    linked    to    ‘socio---economic   
 issues’    which    the    government     was   trying   to   suppress   so   that     they   would   not     lead   to 
  political   instability.   Hence,    the    army’s    involvement    in    the    conflict    gets    justified.    As   
 quoted    by    Respublika’s    portal,    Kozlov,    one    of    the    opposition    leaders    currently    imprisoned,   
 believes    the    government    will    be    using    this    uprising    as    an       excuse     to     implement     some     
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 radical     political     measures.     The     portal     also     suggests     that     ‘law     and    disorder’    can    be    one   
 of    the    possible    frames    for    describing    the    events    in    Zhanaozen    in    2011.       
   
 
Other  bloggers    believe    that    the    events    in    Zhanaozen    in    2011    demonstrate    the    ‘instability   
 within    the    country.’       They       suggest       it       all       could       have       been       provoked       by       particular       
political       groups       within    Kazakhstan    in    order    to    gain    power    after    Nazarbayev    leaves    his   
 posts.    Hence,    the    political    elites    are    trying    to   destabilise   the   situation   so   they   can   
begin   discussions     with   President   Nazarbayev   about    his    succession    plans.        ‘Political   
 instability’    caused    by    the    opposition    in    exile    was    another    prominent    topic.    One    of    the   
 ‘bloody    bloggers’    suggests    that    the    events    in    Zhanaozen    had    nothing    to    do    with    the    oil   
 workers;    instead,    someone    took    advantage    of    them    and    the    situation.       
   
 
The          conspiracy          theories          have          been          quite          prominent.         Bloggers          suggest          that        the          
U.S.          State    Department       could     have     been     involved,     as     well     as     other     western     countries,     
to     get     access     to     the    Caspian    Sea    and    its    oil    reserves    (Saibitov,    2012,    Er    Kulov,    2011).   
 Others2    have    suggested    there    are    a    number            of          strategic          reasons        why          international          
political          actors          would          wish          to          destabilise    Kazakhstan.        One      is      to      cut      China      off      
from      Kazakh      energy     resources;      another      is      to     compare      the    situation    to   NATO’s     
justifications     for     intervening   in   Libya.   Another   goal   is   to     weaken   the   southern   
 borders         of       Russia       and       to       create       geopolitical       chaos       alongside       the       world’s       longest       
border.       The    possible          disintegration       of        the         Customs        Union        between       Russia,        
Kazakhstan       and        Belarus        and    preventing    the    creation    of    the    Eurasian    Union    were    also   
 suggested    by    these    bloggers    as    motives    for    fomenting    the    unrest.    At    the    same    time    other   
 bloggers    implied    it    was    unwise    to    blame    the    U.S.    as    it    was    more    likely    that    former   
 Kazakhstan    citizens    were    involved    (Bahtigareev,    2012).        
   
Voice 
 
The following groups were identified as the main quoted voices in the reported news items and 
blogging sites: government, army, police, Kazakhstan’s Prosecutor General, the KazMunaiGaz 
oil company, political opposition and protesters.  In the course of the data mining processes, it 
became evident that the government, the army, the police and the prosecutor general represent 
the same voice – the official voice of the Kazakh authorities, centred around President 
Nazarbayev. The state-run media mainly used the voices of governmental officials. .  
 
The primary voices in the articles published in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda were the local 
authorities, the Prosecutor General, the academics who supported the government’s assertions, 
the WWII veterans and the bloggers who went on a trip to Zhanaozen which was organised by 
Prime Minister Karim Massimov.  
 
The voices of the Respublika newspaper were the oil workers, their relatives, the local 
governmental representatives, as well as one member of the European Parliament – Paul 
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 Murphy. The newspaper also voiced the information provided by what they called the inside 
sources, members of opposition parties as well as of bloggers. The Respublika portal voiced the 
interests of the local citizens of Zhanaozen, as well as of representatives of the UN, OSCE and 
the U.S. State Department, Kazakhstan’s political opposition in exile and its prominent 
representative Mukhtar Ablyazov, were also voiced.  
The ‘bloody bloggers’ mainly referred to official sources, such as the akimat (mayor’s office), 
the police and the Prosecutor General’s office. During their visit to Zhanaozen, they have also 
interviewed the new representative of the KazMunaiGaz oil company. Some locals were 
interviewed by the ‘bloody bloggers.’ However, as blogger Sadenova noted, people on the streets 
of Zhanaozen were very quiet about the events; hence the bloggers were only able to get a couple 
of comments. Most of the time, people said they did not hear or see anything. The group had also 
interviewed some people at the Zhanaozen hospital. As Sadenova described it, the bloggers shut 
the doors and started talking to the patients. Some said that they have heard of people missing 
and being held by the police. When one of the ‘bloody bloggers’ asked whether they could name 
any, or if they knew anyone personally, the patient said “no.”. However, one wonders how open 
they could have been when the interviews were all being recorded on video.  
The oil workers, their families and the locals of Zhanaozen were the voice of the ‘free bloggers.’ 
Many interviews were recorded and uploaded to YouTube, hence the blogging turned into  
vlogging. By sharing the video interviews with the rest of the world, they were hoping for wider 
coverage as well as the involvement of the international community. 
One of the first who visited Zhanaozen was the Russian journalist Elena Kostyuchenko. She 
covered the case of an individual not connected with the oil workers, or the protesting movement 
for that matter, but who still got held by the police, beaten, and subsequently died. This story was 
widely commented on and discussed in Kazakhstan’s blogosphere, – especially by the ‘free 
bloggers.’  
Those who did not go to Zhanaozen referred to both – the officials and the oil workers. Some 
were referring to either one of the group of bloggers who went to Zhanaozen. Also, the voices of 
some of the political scientists were mentioned as well.  
Story subjects  
The findings have identified three main story subjects, discussions about social networking 
websites; socio-economic issues; and the role of printed media and TV in the events of 
Zhanaozen.  
 
Discussions about social networking websites 
 
How information was disseminated through social networking websites was covered by blogs as 
well as stories the main stream official media. The Republika portal dedicated a few stories to its 
own blocking online as well as to the restriction imposed on Twitter. Republika’s website also 
provided detailed information on how to avoid blocking by using proxy services. Some of the 
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 stories it posted had rather controversial content which frequently contradicted the authorities’ 
positions. They reported on the gas used against protesters; suggestions that war had already 
started in the region; or how the opposition leaders were prevented from boarding the plan to 
Zhanaozen; and that the ‘bloody bloggers were taken to the town like VIPs – their integrity. 
Respublika even questioned the ‘propaganda’ skills of the government by asking why it revealed 
that selected bloggers were taken to Zhanaozen, as not making this public would have made their 
stories more credible to the Kazakhstani public. They also questioned why independent bloggers 
were not allowed into the area. 
 
The role of the media, both mainstream and online, in covering the protests was also discussed 
by the free bloggers. Sadenova (2011) comments on the role of the Respublika newspaper and 
the messages it put online urging people to join protestors on the main street. She suggests that if 
one is referring to provocations, not only should the actions of those young ‘hooligans’ who 
were reported to be wearing black clothing on the day be evaluated, but also the messages put 
out by the pro-government media too.  The ‘bloody bloggers’ also commented on the role of 
television as some videos released by K+ resulted in arrests of a few protestors. These videos 
assisted police with identifying them. The ‘bloody bloggers’ discussed ‘that’ (as it was referred 
to) particular video posted on YouTube right after the events.  In regards to Twitter, some 
‘bloody bloggers’ supported its blocking (Elikbayev, 2011). It seems they were also aware they 
were called the ‘bloody bloggers,’ as some revelled in announcing their ‘bloody [online] 
following.’ In addition, the events in Zhanaozen were also covered by another ‘bloody blogger’ 
who posted a photo-story of Zhanaozen to the photo-blogging platform www.voxpopuli.kz  
 
One of the main discussions taking place amongst those bloggers who did not go on the 
organised trip to Zhanaozen was the ‘Twitter counter-revolution’ organised by Nazarbayev. A 
blogger named Kromanionez (Toregozhina, 2011) comments that the former prime minister’s 
bloggers worked very systematically and professionally – the links to their ‘blog-tour’ were on 
the Russian news sources, such as RBK, Rosbalt and ‘Echo Moskvi’ – the latter even wrote an 
article called ‘Battle online: Bloggers against the ‘Soldiers of Khalifat.’ The same commentator 
claims the prime minister gathered ‘popular’ yet ‘loyal’ bloggers  and organising the so-called 
‘blog-tour’ to cover up the execution of its citizens in Zhanaozen. He also used his official 
website (http://pm.kz/zhanaozen/ru) as a platform for live Twitter conversations. The same 
blogger commented that the ‘bloody bloggers’ had dropped any pretence of impartiality by 
posting interviews with the authorities while ignoring those they saw injured at the hospital.  
 
Bakhytzhan2010 (Toregozhina, 2011) posted information about the bloggers who went to 
Zhanaozen independently and who were denied official media accreditation. The video covering 
the conversation of these bloggers with the authorities about their inability to go to Zhanaozen 
was posted on YouTube and re-posted by Bakhytzhan2010 into her blog. Additional videos 
included interviews with locals who suggested the police should take the responsibility for what 
happened in Zhanaozen.  
 
Dmitry Shyolokov, one of the free bloggers who visited Zhanaozen, posted a message stating 
that for the very first time in the history of Kazakhstan, the bloggers became the source of 
information not published previously by official media. When talking to the people of 
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 Zhanaozen, he did not feel like he was a blogger, nor a journalist, but rather a member of the 
committee investigating the events of Zhanaozen 2011. Possibly, he suggests, this might have 
been the turning point in the history of the Kazakhstan’s blogging (Shoylokov, 2012).  
Shyolokov’s observations tell us about the emergence  of a new public sphere created by social 
media.   
 
Online tactics to divert public opinion were also discussed by the independent bloggers. 
Kromanionez (2011) for instance noted that the ‘bloody bloggers’ were re-tweeting the article 
written by Elena Kostyuchenko where she expressed support for lesbians as a way of 
discrediting trying to discredit her and redirecting  public attention away her post about the 
victims of police torture. Traditional Kazakh society does not tolerate homosexuality and 
connecting a journalist or a blogger with the gay or lesbian communities would discredit them in 
the eyes of many Kazakhs.   
 
A blogger, Murat, not directly involved in the events of Zhanaozen, confirmed that he was asked 
by the oil workers to delete them from the newsfeed list on Twitter which they had signed up to. 
The oil workers were afraid law enforcement agencies were checking up on everyone using 
Twitter and Facebook in Zhanaozen. Murat acknowledged that the investigators were looking for 
people who taught the protesting oil workers how to use social networking websites and realised 
that he was  also under surveillance (Atambayev, 2012). In 2011, Murat was training the activists 
of Zhanaozen on how to use the latest communications technology. Moreover, after he  trained 
the members of the Alga party – whose leader is now imprisoned –  how to make videos and 
upload them to YouTube, the KNB accused him of trying to organise a Kazakhstani Arab 
Spring. It is clear the authorities understand very well the dangers that new media pose to their 
version of social and political stability.   
  
The blocking of Twitter also was discussed by the independent bloggers. The blogger 
likelike_you (2011) reported that two days after Twitter was blocked, a message appeared 
suggesting the owners of the website had problems. The blogger believes the Kazakh authorities 
were panicking as they could not predict the effect mass Twitter usage was having on society. 
 
The events in Zhanaozen allowed some bloggers to have a general debate about the role of the 
internet and television in the ‘war to win over the society’s consciousness.’ Blogger subject 
(2011) suggests that the Internet allows the formation of an alternative perspective to the one 
shown on TV by the authorities. The blogger believes that in the future, the role of new media 
will only increase if the authorities do not change their information policies. Another tendency, 
the blogger argues, is the disappointment in the traditional media in general. The internet allows 
people to find those who think alike, and the Kazakhs are learning to use these options fast.  
 
According to Andrea Schmitz (2012), the events in Zhanaozen are symptoms of an emerging 
crisis. In accordance with the so called ‘social contract’ initiated by Nazarbayev, everyone is 
granted the right to pursue financial profits in exchange for giving up their political freedom. 
Recently, however, the terms and conditions of this ‘contract’ were reconsidered as the 
protesting oil workers had access to neither  financial profit nor political freedom. The blogger 
speculates that this ‘social contract’ may not work in the future (http://yvision.kz/post/215176).  
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A number of bloggers suggested that an information war against Kazakhstan was taking place 
(http://yvision.kz/post/215344 and http://yvision.kz/post/215262). According to these bloggers, 
there was nothing to prove the  deaths of ‘hundreds of people’ as well as the ‘bloody shootings 
of the civilians.’ ‘That’ particular video, according to one of the bloggers, became the best 
propaganda tool. Some bloggers urged all citizens of Kazakhstan to contact KNB or the police if 
they notice someone who may be trying to organise a provocation 
(http://yvision.kz/post/215716). Some bloggers quoted a Chinese politician who believed that the 
events in Zhanaozen were organised from abroad, and China was prepared to offer its help to 
prevent the same from happening in future (http://yvision.kz/216434). 
 
Although the ‘free bloggers’ criticised the ‘bloody bloggers,’ their own credibility was also 
questioned by some. One blogger posted a note written by the taxi driver who took the ‘free’ 
bloggers to another city. The videos uploaded by the ‘free bloggers’ to YouTube were called 
fake by this blogger (http://yvision.kz/post/219124). 
 
The idea behind the trip of the ‘bloody bloggers’ to Zhanaozen, according to Sadenova, was to 
dispel the rumours that started to circulate in Kazakhstan. Hence, most of the posts were 
dedicated to explaining what did and did not take place on the 16th of December, and how the 
information was misused by the political opposition.  
 
Those who did not go to Zhanaozen, or went on a trip on their own, mainly focused on the issues 
of the oil workers, the tortures which were taking place in Zhanaozen, as well as how the event 
was portrayed in some of the Russian media. However, the ‘bloody bloggers’ were backing up 
the government’s assertions which stated that the events in Zhanaozen were not as dramatic as 
presented by the opposition, whereas the rest focused on what was taking place in Zhanaozen on 
a day-to-day basis.   
 
Bribery was mentioned by one blogger who claimed to be offered $200 by one of the Bnews 
journalists to write positive news about the upcoming parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan. He 
declined the offer, but uploaded a print screen of the conversation on the internet 
(http://yvision.kz/post/217518). It is interesting to note, that journalists from the very same 
newspaper went to Zhanaozen with the bloody bloggers to write about the uprising.  
 
All this clearly indicate that the debate about different forms reporting on Zhanaozen and also 
the different groups of reporters were taking place in parallel with the reporting itself.    
 
The role of printed media and TV 
 
The president of the K+TV company became part of the story s in the article published by 
Respublika. Here he argues that if only the events in Zhanaozen in the summer of 2011 were 
covered by the state media, people would know what was happening and would have probably 
figured out how to deal with the emerging socio-economic issues. According to K+TV, President 
Nazarbayev is disappointed that the information about Zhanaozen is leaking out of the country to 
Russia, hence, had asked Medvedev, then the President of the Russian Federation, to block the 
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 K+ TV station on the territory of the Russian Federation. The journalists of the same TV station 
addressed Nazarbayev to help to stop the surveillance which was implemented towards them.  
 
One blogger suggested that the opposition mass media, such as K+ and Respublika were only 
making matters worse in Zhanaozen. The blogger believed that the state should have its own 
journalists on state TV and in newspapers who would cover the events impartially. This, the 
blogger concluded, could only help the protesters to trust the authorities 
(http://yvision.kz/post/215262). Adam Kesher, one of the most active bloggers in the Kazakh 
blogosphere, touched on the issue of media’s responsibility arguing that journalists sometimes 
can also be manipulated by media agencies as well as by the authorities. The blogger argued that 
there is no independent media in Kazakhstan, making a distinction between state news and 
‘difference news.’ According to Kesher, nobody criticises the state media not because everyone 
is happy with it, but because no one expects much from it. However, the public expects a lot 
from K+ as it is portrayed as independent. He expressed his dissatisfaction with how the K+TV 
channel mixed together the oil workers and those who provoked the uprising. It is obvious, he 
argued, that the state should admit that the force used was unlawful, and the police should face 
the consequences (http://adam-kesher.yvision.kz/post/215001).  
 
 
The way traditional outlets took limited notice of the blogging activity and reported on it and the 
blogger’s coverage  of  events, indicate some kind of impact by the blogosphere on mainstream 
media.  
 
Language use 
 
According to the census taken in 2009, only two-thirds of Kazakhstan’s 16,878 million 
inhabitants have a decent command of Kazakh, which is the state language. Kazakhs comprise 
about 62 per cent of the population. Russians form the biggest minority group and the Russian 
language is a lingua franca officially alongside Kazakh in state bodies. The knowledge of 
Russian in Kazakhstan is widespread, with 94 per cent understanding it orally and 85 per cent 
able to read and write it (http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62424, Emrich & Plakhina, 2013).  
During the Soviet era, the Russian language came to dominate politics, business, education, and 
media. The current situation reﬂects that legacy. Although the proportion of the ethnic Kazakh 
population is steadily growing, many people still prefer using Russian in everyday life and for 
news consumption. According to the constitution, Kazakh is the official state language while 
Russian is an official language of “inter-ethnic communication,” and along with Kazakh is an 
official language of use in state institutions and local self-government bodies (OSF, 2013).  
Given this, it was expected the state-run media, newspapers supported by the political opposition 
as well as most bloggers would use Russian. Not only would this allow the majority of  
Kazakhstan’s population to understand the information, it would also give an opportunity to 
those who are outside of Kazakhstan to be informed about the event.  
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 It is interesting to note however, that all ‘bloody bloggers’ were ethnic Kazakhs, while the ‘free 
bloggers’ were a mixed group including ethnic Russians. This ethnic representation was not 
visible language wise and it is more noticeable with the ‘bloody bloggers’ whose ethnicity seems 
to be a selection criterion but which does not manifest itself in the language chosen. 
 
Some of the relatives of the oil workers interviewed by the ‘free’ bloggers could only speak 
Kazakh, however, that was translated by the interviewers into Russian. In one instance, a ‘bloody 
blogger’ asked a colleague and another blogger to translate her post into English.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Analysis of online social media and activism during the social unrest in Zhanaozen made it 
apparent that the old authoritarian method dealing with social and political uprisings by simply 
cutting the place off from the outside world will not work any longer in Kazakhstan. Political 
activists mobilised online social media to inform the nation and the world about the uprising and 
the role of the government authorities in the repressions and punishment that followed.  
However, the research also demonstrates that the Kazakh government mobilised to find effective 
ways to control online social media. The invitation of the group who were quickly labelled the 
‘bloody bloggers’, to visit Zhanaozen and to report on the uprising echoes the old model that 
existed in the former USSR; when ‘accredited journalists’ were ‘employed’ by the state to 
transmit the official messages and state ideology.   
   
The attempts by the Kazakh government to control the situation resulted in the separation of the 
bloggers into a few distinctive groups according to their allegiance to the authorities. The 
bloggers who support the regime or ‘bloody bloggers,’  the free bloggers who were not invited 
by the authorities to visit Zhanaozen and went there by their own, and the third group of ‘other’ 
bloggers who do not belong to the first two groups and which made online reporting even more 
complex.  
 
The power of online activism in Kazakhstan is evident from the government attempts to 
manipulate at least some bloggers to make them report the official line.  Mainstream media 
acknowledges the existence of online media by utilising their reporting for their own 
publications. Hence, the next step would be to look at whether or not social media and online 
activism pose a new challenge for Kazakh authoritarianism.   
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